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Abstract—Revising its beliefs when receiving new information
is an important ability of any intelligent system. However, in
realistic settings the new input is not always certain. A compelling
way of dealing with uncertain input in an agent-based setting
is to treat it as unreliable input, which may strengthen or
weaken the beliefs of the agent. Recent work focused on the
postulates associated with this form of belief change and on
finding semantical operators that satisfy these postulates. In this
paper we propose a new syntactic approach for this form of belief
change and show that it agrees with the semantical definition.
This makes it feasible to develop complex agent systems capable
of efficiently dealing with unreliable input in a semantically
meaningful way. Additionally, we show that imposing restrictions
on the input and the beliefs that are entailed allows us to devise
a tractable approach suitable for resource-bounded agents or
agents where reactiveness is of paramount importance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Revision plays an important role in intelligent systems, such
as BDI agents [16], where we need to deal with the dynamic
nature of knowledge and beliefs. In the seminal work [1]
the authors introduced the so-called AGM postulates, which
identify how new information should be added to a knowledge
base to preserve consistency. Later, in [8], it was demonstrated
that the AGM postulates were insufficient to deal with iterated
belief revision. To overcome this problem four additional
postulates were introduced that more precisely define how a
revision operator should behave when dealing with iterated
revision. A key concept was the realisation that the belief sets,
as used in the AGM approach, are inadequate. Instead, belief
revision should be a process on the epistemic state rather than
the belief set (where the first induces the latter, but not vice
versa). A common way of representing an epistemic state is
by assigning weights to the various possible worlds. A natural
extension to this idea is then to also associate a weight with
the input resulting in weighted or uncertain input.
An important consideration when dealing with uncertain
input is how the input should be interpreted [10]. One in-
terpretation is that the input acts as a constraint that must be
satisfied by the revision, i.e. after revision we want to be able
to entail the given formula with exactly the specified degree of
uncertainty. Another interpretation is that the uncertain input is
treated as a new belief with an associated strength. The input
is then seen as an extra piece of evidence that may or may
not be useful. This last approach is common in our everyday
lives. Indeed, assume we have tickets for a sporting event and
a single random person on social media tells you that the event
is cancelled. Most likely, this single post will not be enough to
convince you that the event is actually cancelled. However, as
more and more people post messages that the event is cancelled
you may eventually revise your opinion, depending on how
ingrained the original belief is. Similarly, interpreting uncertain
beliefs as new information with an associated strength makes
sense in an agent-based setting where it should be the strength
of the information that determines if it is adopted or not.
A framework for managing unreliable inputs, i.e. interpreted
as new pieces of information that may or may not be relevant,
has been presented in [14]. The authors of this work start
by presenting a new definition of epistemic states that can
be used to deal with different kinds of uncertain belief rep-
resentations. In particular, their definition can be instantiated
to, among others, ordinal conditional functions (OCF) [14]
and representations based on infinitesimal probabilities [7].
Using this new and general definition of an epistemic state,
the authors propose rational postulates that a belief change
operator dealing with unreliable input should adhere to, along
with a (semantical) belief change operator that satisfies these
postulates. Furthermore, they show that their belief change
operator reduces to iterated belief revision in the sense of
Darwiche and Pearl [8] when new input has a higher strength
than any of the current beliefs held by the agent. However, their
work only focuses on the semantics and theoretical properties
and does not consider practical approaches to belief change.
In this paper we introduce a syntactic operator for dealing
with unreliable input. We prove that this syntactic opera-
tor corresponds to the semantic operator introduced in [14].
In addition, we explore the feasibility of a tractable approach.
We show that tractability can be achieved by restricting the
form of both the input and the language of formulas to be
evaluated. Even though the input language is restricted, it
remains highly expressive (e.g. formulas in DNF are allowed).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Some
preliminary notions are mentioned in Section II. A syntactic
approach for dealing with uncertain input is described in Sec-
tion III and a tractable approach is discussed in Section IV.
Related work is discussed in Section V and conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
2II. PRELIMINARIES
We start with some necessary preliminaries on epistemic
states, which can be used to model the beliefs of an intelligent
system or agent (Section II-A). Based on the beliefs held by an
agent, we can verify if a given arbitrary formula is entailed,
i.e. if it is believed. Commonly, such formulas are classical
(i.e. Boolean) and entailment is only checked against the most
strongly held beliefs. However, as shown in [3], it is possible to
consider a more expressive language that also allows to reflect
on the uncertainty associated with those beliefs (Section II-B).
A. Modelling Uncertain Beliefs as Epistemic States
To define epistemic states, we start with a finite set of
atoms At and a language L constructed over it. We use Lit
to denote the set of literals that can be constructed from At,
i.e. Lit = {a | a ∈ At} ∪ {¬a | a ∈ At}. For a literal l ∈ Lit
we use l∗ to denote the underlying atom, i.e. l∗ = a when
l = a or l = ¬a. Propositions in L are defined in Backus-Naur
Form (BNF) as ϕ ::= a | ¬a | (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) | (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), i.e. all
propositions are in Negation Normal Form (NNF), where any
arbitrary formula can be efficiently converted into NNF. We use
lit(ϕ) to denote the set of unique literals used in a formula ϕ.
A possible world ω (or interpretation) is a function that maps
At onto {0, 1}. The set of all possible worlds is denoted by Ω,
i.e. Ω = 2At. A possible world ω is a model of a proposition ϕ
iff ω(ϕ) = 1, denoted as ω |= ϕ. We use Mod(ϕ) to denote
the set of models of ϕ. An epistemic state, used to represent
the beliefs of an agent, is then defined as:
Definition 1. (from [14]) Let Ω be a set of possible worlds.
An epistemic state Φ is a mapping Φ : Ω→ Z ∪ {−∞,+∞}.
An epistemic state will be used to represent the mental
state of an agent, where the value Φ(ω) associated with a
possible world ω, called the weight of ω, is understood as
the degree of belief in the possible world ω. Throughout the
paper we denote epistemic states using capital Greek letters.
When Φ(ω) = ∞ (resp. −∞) it means the agent believes ω
is fully plausible (resp. not plausible at all) while Φ(ω) = 0
denotes that the agent is totally ignorant about ω. For ω, ω′ ∈ Ω
and Φ(ω) > Φ(ω′) the intuition is that ω is more plausible
than ω′. When the agent learns the new information that ϕ
holds, with weight m, then this is represented as a simple
epistemic state Φin such that Φin(ω) = m when ω |= ϕ and
Φin(ω) = 0 otherwise. This simple epistemic state, which
corresponds to the input (ϕ,m), is then used to revise the
agent’s epistemic state Φ. The operator introduced in [14]
to revise an epistemic state Φ by Φ′, denoted as Φ ◦ Φ′,
is ∀ω ∈ Ω, (Φ ◦ Φ′)(ω) = Φ(ω) + Φ′(ω). Since an input
corresponds to a simple epistemic state, we often simply write
Φ ◦ (ϕ,m). We will also use Φ ◦ I with I = 〈i1, ..., in〉 a
sequence of inputs to denote Φ ◦ i1 ◦ ... ◦ in.
It is important to clarify that the definition of an epistemic
state given in Definition 1 allows for the construction of a
general framework for dealing with uncertain beliefs. Indeed,
this definition does not impose any restrictions on the values
associated with the possible worlds, other than that they are
weights. Other representations for epistemic states, which
attach more specific meaning to the values, have been shown
to be equivalent to the one from Definition 1. Specifically, Def-
inition 1 induces an Ordinal Conditional Function (OCF) [17],
[14]1, which in turn can be transformed into other represen-
tations, e.g. those based on infinitesimal probabilities [7] and
possibility theory [11]. The representation from Definition 1
can thus be instantiated using any of the other representations
to best suit the nature of the uncertainty. The epistemic state
given in Definition 1, however, is easier to work with as it
relies on integers (and not e.g. ordinal numbers) and because
it does not need a normalisation step (e.g. as needed in OCF).
Example 1. Let At = {a, b, c}. Consider the epistemic state
Φ such that Φ({a, b, c}) = Φ({a,¬b, c}) = Φ({a, b,¬c}) =
Φ({a,¬b,¬c}) = 3 and Φ(ω) = 0 for all other possible
worlds ω. Intuitively, this models an agent that believes ‘a’ is
more plausible than ‘¬a’. Indeed, exactly those possible worlds
that model ‘a’ have a higher weight than the others. We say
that the agent believes ‘a’ with a strength of 3 and is ignorant
about the other literals in Lit. Now consider the input (c, 2).
This input corresponds to the simple epistemic state Φ′ for
which Φ′({a, b, c}) = Φ′({a,¬b, c}) = Φ′({¬a, b, c}) =
Φ′({¬a,¬b, c}) = 2 while for all other worlds ω we have that
Φ′(ω) = 0. The result of revising Φ given the input, denoted
as Ψ = Φ ◦ (c, 2), is given by Ψ such that:
Ψ({a, b, c}) = 5 Ψ({¬a, b, c}) = 2
Ψ({a,¬b, c}) = 5 Ψ({¬a,¬b, c}) = 2
Ψ({a, b,¬c}) = 3 Ψ({¬a, b,¬c}) = 0
Ψ({a,¬b,¬c}) = 3 Ψ({¬a,¬b,¬c}) = 0
In other words: the agent most strongly believes that both ‘a’
and ‘c’ are true in the real world, as expected, while still being
ignorant as to whether ‘b’ is true or false.
The belief set, i.e. the sentences that an agent is committed
to believe, is commonly defined as the set that has all the
most plausible worlds as its models. To define this set, we first
define the notion of a preorder. A preorder ≤A on a set A is a
reflexive and transitive relation over A×A. We say that ≤A is
total iff for all a, b ∈ A we have that either a ≤A b or b ≤A a.
Definition 2. (from [14]) Let Φ be an epistemic state. We have
that Bel(Φ) = {ϕ ∈ L | ω |= ϕ for all ω ∈ min(Ω,≤Φ)} is
the belief set of Φ. Here ≤Φ is a total preorder relation over
Ω such that ω ≤Φ ω′ iff Φ(ω) ≥ Φ(ω′) and min(Ω,≤Φ)
denotes the set of minimal elements of Ω according to ≤Φ.
We can also specify Bel(Φ) as the strongest (i.e. having the
least models) proposition ϕ such that Mod(ϕ) = min(Ω,≤Φ).
This proposition is, of course, unique up to logical equivalence.
Example 2. Consider Ψ from Example 1. The models
with the highest weight are given by min(Ω,≤Ψ) =
{{a, b, c} , {a,¬b, c}} and thus Bel(Ψ) = a∧c. We can easily
verify that the agent believes that ‘a’ must be true, since
a ∧ c |= a. Similarly, the agent does not believe that ‘b’ must
also be true since a ∧ c 6|= a ∧ b. This is as expected, given
that the agent is ignorant about the actual truth value of ‘b’.
1In addition, in [14] it has been shown that revising an epistemic state with
an uncertain input is equivalent to combining the two corresponding OCFs
using the combination operator suggested in [13].
3B. Reasoning about Uncertain Beliefs
A belief set only gives us information about the most plau-
sible beliefs. Still, an epistemic state also contains information
on whether one option is more plausible than another, even if
we currently believe neither to be true [3]. To deal with this,
the language L≥, which extends L, can be defined in BNF as:
ϕ ::= a | ¬a | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ≥ ϕ2 | ϕ1 > ϕ2
To define the semantics of L≥, we first define a mapping λ,
which maps arbitrary formulas ϕ ∈ L≥ onto Z∪{−∞,+∞}:
λ(ϕ) =
{
max {Φ(ω) | ω |= ϕ} if ϕ ∈ L
λ(pare(ϕ)) otherwise
with max(∅) = −∞. The intuition of λ(ϕ) is that it is the
maximum weight that can be associated with the formula ϕ,
i.e. it reflects how strongly the agent believes ϕ to be true.
When ϕ is not a propositional statement (i.e. ϕ 6∈ L), we
need to pare down the formula until the formula is a clas-
sical propositional statement. For this we define the function
check(ϕ) which determines if ϕ needs to be further pared
down, i.e. check(ϕ) = ϕ if ϕ ∈ L and otherwise check(ϕ) =
pare(ϕ). We then have pare(ϕ⊗ ψ) = check(ϕ)⊗ check(ψ)
with ⊗ ∈ {∧,∨} and
pare(ϕ ≥ ψ) =
{> if λ(¬ϕ) ≤ λ(¬ψ)
⊥ otherwise
In other words: ≥ (or >, which is defined equivalently) is
treated as a plausibility ordering where an expression such
as ϕ > ψ is read as “ϕ is more plausible than ψ” or, “we
have less reason to believe ¬ϕ than ¬ψ”. Such an expression
can always be evaluated to true or false, i.e. > (tautology) or
⊥ (contradiction).
Definition 3. Let Φ be an epistemic state and ϕ a formula in
L≥. We say that ϕ is entailed by Φ, written as Φ |= ϕ, if and
only if λ(ϕ) > λ(¬ϕ).
Example 3. Consider Φ′ from Example 1. We have
that Φ′ |= (a ∧ c) ∧ (b > ¬c). Indeed, we have that
λ((a ∧ c) ∧ (b > ¬c)) > λ((¬a ∨ ¬c) ∨ (¬c ≥ b)). We need
to pare down the formula on the left-hand side for which we
find λ(b) > λ(¬c) since λ(b) = 5 and λ(¬c) = 3, i.e. we find
λ(a ∧ c ∧ >) = 5. Similarly, for the right-hand side, we find
a λ-value of 3. We can thus derive that the agent not only
believes that a ∧ c is true (in the sense of beliefs in classical
logic), but also that the agent believes b to be more plausible
than ¬c.
Any proposition in L≥ can also be turned into an equivalent
formula in NNF form in the usual way and by rewriting
¬(ψ1 ≥ ψ2) as (ψ2 > ψ1) and ¬(ψ1 > ψ2) as (ψ2 ≥ ψ1).
We assume this has been done when needed throughout paper.
III. SYNTACTIC REVISION
In this section we develop a general syntactic approach
to belief change with uncertain inputs, suitable for use in
a BDI setting. In particular, since a BDI agent not only
has to revise its beliefs but even more frequently has to
verify the applicability of plans, we balance the complexity of
belief change and belief entailment accordingly. In addition,
as previously mentioned, we want the context of a plan to be
formulas in the language L≥ so that the agent can reflect upon
its own uncertain beliefs.
First, we need to decide on a syntactic representation of
the beliefs currently held by an agent. A common way of
syntactically representing an epistemic state Φ is by means
of a finite set of weighted formulas (ψ,m) with m the weight
of formula ψ (e.g. [18], [4]). However, such a representation
would make it complex to verify if a belief is entailed when
considering uncertain input. Indeed, the weight of a possible
world ω in the semantical representation might be dependent
on the weight of some or all of the formulas in the syntactic
representation. Instead, we propose a syntactic representation
that is closer to the semantical one by requiring that no two
weighted formulas are pairwise satisfiable:
Definition 4. A weighted belief base B is a set of formulas of
the form (ψ,m) with ψ ∈ L and m ∈ Z so that there does not
exist (ψi,mi), (ψj ,mj) ∈ B for which ψi ∧ ψj is satisfiable.
On a semantical level, this definition enforces that
Mod(ψi) ∩Mod(ψj) = ∅, i.e. none of the classical formulas
in B have models in common. While this representation might
at first appear restrictive, it is important to note that on
the semantical level the possible worlds adhere to this exact
same restriction. Intuitively, in a weighted belief base B, each
formula (ψ,m) ∈ B will correspond to the set of possible
worlds Mod(ψ) which all share the same weight.
Example 4. Consider the epistemic states Φ and Φ′ from
Example 1. We can compactly represent Φ using the weighted
belief base {(a, 3)}. Similarly, we can represent Φ′ using the
weighted belief base {(a ∧ c, 5), (¬a ∧ c, 2), (a ∧ ¬c, 3)}.
Next, we formalise the intuition from the previous example
and define how the semantical representation corresponding
with a weighted belief base B can be retrieved.
Definition 5. Let B be a weighted belief base. The epistemic
state ΦB defined as
ΦB(ω) =
{
m if there exists a (ψ,m) ∈ B such that ω |= ψ
0 otherwise
is the (semantical) epistemic state induced by B.
The above definition formalises the intuition that every
formula (ϕ,m) in B corresponds to a set of models Mod(ϕ)
such that for every ω ∈ Mod(ϕ) we have that ΦB(ω) = m.
Hence, as desired, a weighted belief base is a compact repre-
sentation of a semantical epistemic state. Furthermore, every
epistemic state can be represented as a compact weighted belief
base. Indeed, for ω ∈ Ω we can define the equivalence class
[ω] = {ω′ ∈ Ω | Φ(ω) = Φ(ω′)}, i.e. all possible worlds with
the same weight. For each equivalence class [ω] of Φ we then
have that (ϕω,Φ(ω)) ∈ B with ϕω a proposition such that
Mod(ϕω) = [ω]. So, ϕω is a proposition that has as its models
exactly those possible worlds that are in the equivalence class
[ω]. It then readily follows from Definition 5 that Φ = ΦB.
Importantly, a weighted belief base makes it straightforward
to determine the weight associated with any arbitrary formula:
4Proposition 1. Let B be a weighted belief base and ϕ ∈ L
a formula. We have that λ(ϕ) = mi 6= 0 iff there exists a
(ψi,mi) ∈ B such that ψi ∧ ϕ is satisfiable and there does
not exist a (ψj ,mj) ∈ B with mj > mi such that ψj ∧ ϕ is
satisfiable. Otherwise, λ(ϕ) = 0.
Proof: This readily follows from the definition of λ(ϕ) =
maxω|=ϕ ΦB(ω) and from Definition 5. Indeed, since every
formula in B is a compact representation of a set of possible
worlds ω and since none of the classical formulas in B share
models, the definition of λ(ϕ) reduces to finding the formula
(ψi,mi) in B with the highest weight mi such that it shares
models with ϕ, i.e. such that ω |= ϕ or ϕ ∧ ψi is satisfiable.
Otherwise, from Definition 5, we know that λ(ϕ) = 0.
Proposition 2. Let B be a weighted belief base, ϕ ∈ L
a formula and mi ∈ Z a weight. Determining whether
λ(ϕ) = mi is NP-complete.
Proof: It readily follows that this decision problem is
in NP due to Proposition 1, i.e. verifying whether λ(ϕ) = mi
requires |B| satisfiability checks, which is an NP-complete
problem. To prove NP-hardness, we reduce the satisfiability
problem, i.e. verifying whether a given formula ψ is sat-
isfiable, to the problem of verifiying whether λ(ϕ) = mi.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that ψ is in NNF.
Let B = {(ψ, 1)} and ϕ = a†∨¬a† with a† a fresh atom, i.e. ϕ
is a tautology. We have that ψ is satisfiable iff λ(ϕ) = 1. In-
deed, we know from Proposition 1 that determining λ(ϕ) = 1
is equivalent to verifying that ψ ∧ ϕ is satisfiable or, equiva-
lently, that ψ is satisfiable since ϕ is a tautology.
We now need to verify whether a syntactic revision operator
actually exists that can transform a weighted belief base into
another set of formulas given an arbitrary input. This new set
of formulas then has to:
(1) agree with the definition of a weighted belief base; and
(2) correspond with belief change on the semantical level.
Before we define the syntactic revision operator, we first
introduce some new terminology that will help us to
simplify the definition. For a weighted belief base B
we use B∗ to denote the classical set of formu-
las, i.e. B∗ = {ψi | (ψi,mi) ∈ B}. The notation max(B)
is used to denote the set of classical formulas in B
with the highest weight. In other words, we have that
max(B) = {ψi | (ψi,mi) ∈ B, 6 ∃(ψj ,mj) ∈ B ·mj > mi}.
It follows from max(B) and Definition 5 that Bel(ΦB) =∨ {ϕ | ϕ ∈ max(B)}. Indeed, the models corresponding with
the formulas in max(B) are exactly the models of the belief set
of ΦB. We can then define the syntactic operator as follows:
Definition 6. Let B be a weighted belief base and (ϕ, µ)
a non-trivial input, i.e. µ 6= 0. Let Bϕ = {(ψ,m) |
(ψ,m) ∈ B and ψ ∧ ϕ is consistent}. We define B′ as:
B′ = {(ψ ∧ ϕ,m+ µ), (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ,m) | (ψ,m) ∈ Bϕ}
∪ B \ Bϕ
The syntactic revision of B with the input (ϕ, µ), denoted as
B◦s (ϕ, µ), is given by B◦s (ϕ, µ) = B′∪ ((ϕ∧¬
∨
(B∗ϕ)), µ).
Intuitively, (ψ∧ϕ) describes the models shared by ψ and ϕ,
(ψ∧¬ϕ) are those models in ψ but not in ϕ and (ϕ∧¬∨(B∗ϕ))
are those models in ϕ that are not yet in B∗ϕ. Also, whenever
ψ ∧ ¬ϕ is inconsistent we could simply omit it from B′ as it
conveys no information.
Example 5. Let B0 = {} be an empty weighted belief base.
We revise B0 with (a, 3) and then with (c, 2). We trivially have
that B1 = B0 ◦s (a, 3) = {(a, 3)} since B0 is empty. We find
B2 = B1 ◦s (c, 2) = {(a ∧ c, 5), (a ∧ ¬c, 3), (c ∧ ¬a, 2)}.
We can check that max(B2) = {a ∧ c}, i.e. we have that
Bel(B2) = a ∧ c. Notice that the inputs coincide with
Example 1, as does the resulting belief set. Furthermore, the
results coincide with the intuition expressed in Example 4.
It is easy to see that the syntactic operator only grows B
in polynomial space. Indeed, after each revision with an
input the number of new weighted formulas is bounded by
O(2 · |B|+ 1) with |B| the number of weighted formulas in B.
Interestingly, a weighted belief base also cannot, by definition
(i.e. due to the pairwise inconsistency), contain more formulas
than possible worlds. Indeed, since the revision operator ◦s
transforms weighted belief bases into weighted belief bases,
even for smallAt we never have more formulas in the syntactic
representation than possible worlds.
We now verify requirement (1): the syntactic revision needs to
ensure that the set of classical formulas after revision remain
pairwise inconsistent, i.e. the result is a weighted belief base.
Lemma 1. Let B be a weighted belief base and let (ϕ,m) be
an input. For all (ψi,mi), (ψj ,mj) ∈ B we have that ψi∧ψj is
not satisfiable. This condition also holds for B′ = B◦s (ψ,m).
Proof: For an arbitrary propositional formula ρ we
trivially have that Mod(ρ) 6= ∅ when ρ is satisfiable,
Mod(ρ) ∩Mod(¬ρ) = ∅ (i.e. a formula and its negation do not
share models) and Mod(ρ) ∪Mod(¬ρ) = Ω (i.e. the models
of a formula and its negation span all possible worlds).
We first show that modifying the existing weighted formu-
las in Bϕ, defined as B′ in Definition 6, does not violate
the condition imposed by a weighted belief base. For every
weighted formula (ψ,m) ∈ Bϕ we have that ψ∧ϕ is consistent
due to Definition 6, i.e. we have that Mod(ψ) ∩Mod(ϕ) 6= ∅.
Since Mod(ψ) ⊆ Ω with Ω = (Mod(ϕ) ∪Mod(¬ϕ)) and
since Mod(ϕ) ∩Mod(¬ϕ) = ∅ we have that Mod(ψ)
can be rewritten as Mod(ψ ∧ ϕ) ∪Mod(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) with
Mod(ψ ∧ ϕ) ∩Mod(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) = ∅. We thus have that the con-
junction of (ψ ∧ ϕ) and (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) is not satisfiable as these
formulas do not share any models. In addition, for every
weighted formula (ψ′,m) ∈ B \ Bϕ the condition holds by
assumption for B and since Mod(ψ′)∩Mod(ϕ) = ∅. We thus
know that the condition is satisfied for B′ in Definition 6.
It remains to be checked whether ((ϕ ∧ ¬∨(B∗ϕ)),m)
upholds the condition. Since Mod(ρ) ∩ Mod(¬ρ) = ∅ and
Mod(ρ) ∪ Mod(¬ρ) = Ω with ρ = ∨(B∗ϕ) we know that
we can rewrite Mod(ϕ) as Mod(ϕ ∧ ∨(B∗ϕ))) ∪ Mod(ϕ ∧
¬∨(B∗ϕ))) where all models in Mod(ϕ ∧ ∨(B∗ϕ))) are con-
sidered in the case discussed above and, trivially, Mod(ϕ ∧
¬∨(B∗ϕ)))∩Mod(ψ) = ∅ for all (ψ,m) ∈ B since no models
are shared with the negation of a formula.
We now focus our attention on verifying requirement (2):
the revision result obtained using the syntactic revision opera-
5tor must correspond to the result obtained using the semantic
revision operator. Since Lemma 1 shows us that none of the
weighted formulas in a belief base B share any models, we can
simplify this requirement. Indeed, it suffices to verify that the
weight associated with each formula in the syntactic approach
corresponds exactly with the weight associated with its models
(i.e. possible worlds) in the semantical approach. In other
words, we need to verify that Φ(ω) = m with ω ∈ Mod(ψ)
iff (ψ,m) ∈ B and otherwise Φ(ω) = 0. Similar as before, we
will use the notation B ◦s I with I = 〈i1, ..., in〉 a sequence
of inputs to denote B ◦s i1 ◦s ... ◦s in.
Proposition 3. Let I be a finite sequence of inputs. Let Φ0 be
the epistemic state such that ∀ω ∈ Ω we have that Φ0(ω) = 0.
Let B0 = {} and let Φn = Φ0 ◦ I and Bn = B0 ◦s I . We have
that (ψ,m) ∈ Bn iff Φn(ω) = m for every ω ∈ Mod(ψ).
Proof: We prove this by induction on the number of inputs
in I . The base cases are trivial. When I = 〈〉 there is nothing
to do and the proposition holds vacantly. When I contains
only a single element, i.e. I = 〈(ψ1,m1)〉, then we trivially
obtain that B1 = {(ψ1,m1)} while Φ1(ω) = m1 iff ω |= ψ1
and Φ1(ω) = 0 otherwise. This is exactly the epistemic state
induced by B1 according to Definition 5.
Now assume that for a sequence of inputs I of size n with
Bn = B0 ◦s I and Φn = Φ0 ◦ I we have that Φn(ω) = m with
ω ∈ Mod(ψ) iff (ψ,m) ∈ Bn. Equivalently, we thus have that
∀ω ∈ Ω ·Φn(ω) = Ψn(ω) with Ψn the epistemic state induced
by Bn in Definition 5. We show that this equivalence is upheld
after revising with the (n + 1)-th input in = (ϕn+1, µn+1)
where Φn+1 = Φn ◦ in and Bn+1 = Bn ◦s in.
By definition of a simple epistemic state and the semantical
revision operator we know that Φn+1(ω) = Φn(ω) for all ω
such that ω 6|= ψn+1. Similarly, in Bn+1 we have the formulas
Bn \ (Bn)ϕn+1 and the formulas (ψ ∧ ¬ϕn+1,m) for those
(ψ,m) ∈ Bn such that ψ∧ϕn+1 is consistent. In other words:
the weight of formulas that do not have models in common
with ϕn+1 as well as the weight of the models of ψ ∧¬ϕn+1
(those models of ψ that are not models of ϕn+1) is unchanged.
For all ω such that ω 6|= ψn+1 we know that Φn+1(ω) =
Φn(ω) +µn+1. Similarly, in Bn+1 we have the formulas (ψ∧
ϕn+1,m+µn+1) for those (ψ,m) ∈ Bn such that ψ∧ϕn+1 is
consistent. However, there may be models in Mod(ϕn+1) that
are not yet in Bn. Indeed, these models are exactly the models
of the formula ψn+1 ∧ ¬
∨
((Bn)∗ϕ) to which we assign the
weight µn+1. Once again, it is easy to verify from Definition 5
that we thus find ∀ω ∈ Ω · Φn+1(ω) = Ψn+1(ω) with Ψn+1
the epistemic state induced by Bn+1.
The syntactic revision operator introduced in Definition 6
thus behaves as expected. It transforms a weighted belief base
into another weighted belief base, for which it is easy to
determine the λ-value of any arbitrary formula. Furthermore,
we just proved that revision with any arbitrary formula indeed
gives the correct results, i.e. it corresponds with the results that
we would obtain using the semantical operator.
So far we have not considered whether formulas expressed
in the language L≥ can be entailed. However, since we know
how to determine the weight associated with a formula ϕ ∈ L,
it is straightforward to extend our approach to contexts in the
language L≥. Indeed, we can readily apply pare(ϕ ≥ ψ) from
Section II. Furthermore, verifying whether ϕ ≥ ψ holds only
requires |B|+1 satisfiability checks when B is sorted according
to the weight of its formulas. Once we find the highest weight
µ for ϕ, we only need to verify if ψ ∧ ψ′ is satisfiable for
(ψ′, µ′) ∈ B with µ′ ≤ µ. Reasoning about the relationship of
the plausibility of two formulas ϕ ∈ L can thus be done as
efficiently as determining the weight of a formula ϕ ∈ L.
IV. TRACTABLE REVISION
In the previous section we introduced – to the best of our
knowledge – the first syntactic operator capable of dealing
with arbitrary unreliable inputs. However, in many situations,
we may be dealing with resource-bounded agents or agents for
which reactiveness is of paramount importance. In such cases,
the NP-hard syntactic approach from the previous section may
not be feasible or may not be sufficiently fast.
In this section, we develop a tractable approach to belief
change with unreliable inputs. To attain a tractable approach
we impose a number of restrictions. A common restriction in
the literature is to only consider literals as inputs (e.g. [2]).
Based on this restriction, a simple syntactical representation
can be envisaged where we only need to keep track of the
weights +µ and −µ associated with each atom a ∈ At, with +µ
and −µ the weight of resp. a and ¬a. We have:
Definition 7. A compact epistemic state W is a mapping
W : At→ (Z,Z) with W(a) = (+µ,−µ), i.e. the weight associ-
ated with resp. a and ¬a.
The epistemic state ΦW associated with a compact epistemic
state W is defined next. We denote the weight of a literal
l ∈ Lit given a compact epistemic state W as wW(l) = +µ if
l = a and wW(l) =
−
µ if l = ¬a with W(a) = (+µ,−µ).
Definition 8. Let W be a compact epistemic state. We have
that ΦW , defined as
ΦW(ω) =
∑
ω|=l
wW(l)
is the corresponding (semantical) epistemic state.
This definition is similar to Definition 5 from the previous
section, where we now only use a set of literals (which can
share models) as a compact representation of an epistemic
state. Given the way we defined a compact epistemic state, and
since we only allow (weighted) literals as input, a tractable
belief change operator only has to update the weight of the
literal given in the input. We have:
Definition 9. Let W be a compact epistemic state. Let (l, µ)
be an input with l ∈ Lit. We define W ′ =W ◦t (l, µ) as:
W ′(a) =

(
+
µ + µ,
−
µ) if l = a
(
+
µ,
−
µ + µ) if l = ¬a
W(a) otherwise
with W(a) = (+µ,−µ).
Proposition 4. Revising a compact epistemic state can be
implemented using an algorithm with O(log2 |At|) complexity.
6Proof: A compact epistemic state can be implemented as
a sorted map with each element being a pair (a, V ). The atom
‘a’ is used as the key and V is a pair of values. Belief revision
can then be implemented as a binary search over the keys
requiring at most log2(|At|) steps and a constant time update
of the respective value.
Example 6. Consider an agent who has received no prior input,
i.e. W(a) = (0, 0) for every a ∈ At. Assume we successively
update W with the inputs (¬c, 2), (a, 4), (b,−3), (a, 1), (c, 2)
and (¬a, 4). We obtain W ′ with:
W ′(a) = (5, 4) W ′(b) = (−3, 0) W ′(c) = (2, 2).
Now assume that W ′′ =W ′ ◦t (¬b, 4). From Definition 9 we
know that we only have to change the ordered pair associated
with b, i.e. we have W ′′(b) = (−3, 4). The epistemic state
ΦW corresponding with W ′′ according to Definition 8 is:
ΦW({a, b, c}) =4 ΦW({¬a, b, c}) =3
ΦW({a, b,¬c}) =4 ΦW({¬a, b,¬c}) =3
ΦW({a,¬b, c}) =11 ΦW({¬a,¬b, c}) =10
ΦW({a,¬b,¬c}) =11 ΦW({¬a,¬b,¬c}) =10
We now prove the correctness of the operator ◦t introduced
in Definition 9. As before, we use B ◦t I with I = 〈i1, ..., in〉
a sequence of inputs, each of the form (l, µ) with l ∈ Lit and
µ ∈ Z, to denote B ◦t i1 ◦t ... ◦t in.
Proposition 5. Let I be a finite sequence of inputs. Let Φ0 be
an epistemic state such that ∀ω ∈ Ω we have that Φ0(ω) = 0.
Let W0 be a compact epistemic state with W0(a) = (0, 0) for
all a ∈ At and let Φn = Φ0 ◦ I and Wn =W0 ◦t I . We have
that Φn(ω) = ΦWn(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω with ΦWn as defined in
Definition 8.
Proof: We prove this by induction on the number of
inputs in I . When I = 〈〉 the proposition holds trivially.
When I = 〈(l1, µ1)〉 we have Φ1(ω) = µ1 iff ω |= l1 and
Φ1(ω) = 0 otherwise. This corresponds exactly with ΦW1
since wW1(l1) = µ1 and wW1(l) = 0 for all other l ∈ Lit.
Now assume that Φn−1(ω) = ΦWn−1(ω) for I a sequence of
n − 1 inputs. We show that the equivalence is upheld after
revising with the n-th input in = (ln, µn).
Note that Φn−1(ω) 6= Φn(ω) only if ω |= l. In par-
ticular, we have that Φn(ω) = Φn−1(ω) + µn. Similarly,
ΦWn−1(ω) 6= ΦWn(ω) only if ω |= ln. We have that wWn−1 =
wWn +µn from Definition 9 and thus, due to Definition 8, that
ΦWn−1(ω) = ΦWn(ω) +µn. Hence Φn(ω) = ΦWn(ω) due to
the induction hypotheses and since both are modified with the
weight µn only if ω |= l.
So far, we have seen that restricting ourselves to literals
as inputs makes it possible to use a simpler representation
that allows for a very efficient belief change operator. Of
course, what we are eventually interested in is whether a
given formula ϕ is entailed by the agent’s beliefs, i.e. if
the agent beliefs ϕ. To this end we can easily define
the belief set as Bel(W) = ∧ {l | l ∈ Lit, strW(l) > 0} with
strW(l) = wW(l)− wW(¬l) and W a compact epistemic
state. It is then straightforward to verify that, for an arbitrary
compact epistemic stateW , Bel(W) = Bel(ΦW) with ΦW the
epistemic state induced byW . Furthermore, since Bel(W) is a
conjunction of literals, evaluating whether a formula ϕ ∈ L is
true according to the belief set of the agent can easily be done
by verifying whether ϕ is true after replacing all occurrences
of literals from Bel(W) in ϕ by > and all others by ⊥.
The problem becomes more intricate when we want to
determine the λ-value of formulas. To do so efficiently, we
need to restrict the language of the formulas. In particular,
we will look at a fragment of the language for which it is
easy to determine the bounded literals, i.e. those literals for
which the weight is known. To see how this can make it
easier to determine the λ-value, we will reconsider Example 6
where At = {a, b, c}. To determine the λ-value of the formula
(¬a ∧ c) we are forced to use the weight associated with ¬a
and c, i.e. the set of bounded literals is {¬a, c} while ‘b’
is unbounded. Similarly, the possible worlds that satisfy the
formula (¬a ∧ c) are {¬a, b, c} and {¬a,¬b, c}. The weight
of the formula is then the highest weight associated with either
of these possible worlds. From Definition 8 we know that
Φ({¬a, b, c}) = 4 + 2 + (−3) = 3 whereas Φ({¬a,¬b, c}) =
4 + 2 + 4 = 10. In other words: to determine the weight of
the formula we have to use the weight associated with the
bounded literals (i.e. ¬a and c) while we can freely take the
maximum weight associated with either the positive or negative
atom b, since b was unbounded. As long as the fragment of
the language we consider makes it easy and unambiguous to
determine the set of bounded literals, we can thus determine
the λ-value of a formula in a tractable way.
The fragment Lt ⊆ L can be defined in BNF as: 2
disj ::= a | ¬a | disj 1 ∨ disj 2
conj ::= a | ¬a | conj 1 ∧ conj 2
ϕ ::= a | ¬a | disj ∧ conj | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
Intuitively, the language Lt ensures that whenever a con-
junction occurs, one of the branches will be composed of
only conjunctions while the other branch will only contain
disjunctions. Notice that the fragment Lt is quite expressive
as any formula in DNF is part of this language.
We now define the weight associated with a formula in Lt.
To simplify this definition, we introduce the following no-
tations. For l ∈ Lit we define maxW(l) = max(+µ,−µ)
with W(l∗) = (+µ,−µ), i.e. the maximum weight associ-
ated with a given atom or its negation. We define TW =∑
a∈At maxW(a), i.e. the total of all maximum weights as-
sociated with each atom (or: the maximum weight when no
literals are bounded). The value TW can also be computed as
a byproduct of belief change. Indeed, for W ′ =W ◦t (l, µ) it
can easily be computed as TW′ = TW−maxW(l)+maxW′(l).
Definition 10. LetW be a compact epistemic state and ϕ ∈ Lt.
Let L be a set of literals. We recursively define λt(ϕ,L) as:
λt(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, L) = max(λt(ϕ1, L), λt(ϕ2, L))
λt(d ∧ c, L) = λt(d, L ∪ lit(c))
2While the language does not explicitly allow formulas of the form c ∧ d
in ϕ, any such formula can trivially be converted to the form d ∧ c.
7λt(l, L) =
{−∞ if inconst(L ∪ {l})
maxTW (l, L) otherwise
with inconst(S) true whenever ∃a ∈ At · {a,¬a} ⊆ S and
maxTW (l, L) = TW −
∑
l′∈L∪{l}
(wW(l′)−maxW(l′)).
The definition reflects the intuition we described earlier in
the section. To evaluate a formula, we need to keep track of
the bounded literals. A conjunction bounds variables (i.e. it
expresses which literals must be true) while a disjunction takes
the maximum of the values of both operands without altering
the set of bounded literals. A formula that is (reduced to) just
a literal l, is evaluated by considering the set L ∪ {l}, i.e. all
literals bounded so far including l. When L∪{l} is inconsistent
the weight is −∞. Otherwise, the weight is determined by
starting from TW , i.e. the weight of an unbounded formula,
and removing from it the maximum weight associated with the
bounded literals. The correct weight of each bounded literal is
then added to obtain the λ-value of the formula.
Example 7. Consider the formula ϕ = (a ∨ ¬c) ∧ (c ∧ b) and
W ′′ from Example 6. We have:
λt(ϕ, ∅) = λt((a ∨ ¬c) ∧ (c ∧ b), ∅)
= λt(a ∨ ¬c, {b, c})
= max {λt(a, {b, c}), λt(¬c, {b, c})}
= max {λt(a, {b, c}),−∞}
(since {c,¬c} ∈ ({b, c} ∪ {¬c}))
= λt(a, {b, c})
= TW − (5− 5)− (4− (−3))− (2− 2) = 4
We now show that λt(ϕ, ∅) corresponds with λ(ϕ), i.e. the
weight of a formula on the semantical level:
Proposition 6. Let W be a compact epistemic state and ΦW
the epistemic state induced by W . We have that λt(ϕ, ∅) =
λ(ϕ) with λt as in Definition 10.
Proof: We first consider formulas without conjunction.
Since the weight of a disjunction is the maximum of its
constituents, we only need to verify that λt(l, ∅) = λ(l).
By definition, TW is the highest weight associated with any
(set of) possible world(s). Either l is entailed by a world
with the highest weight, in which case wW(l) ≥ wW(¬l),
i.e. TW − maxW(l) + wW(l) = TW . Otherwise, wW(l) <
wW(¬l) and the possible world ω such that ω |= l is the one
that entails all other literals with highest associated weight. As
such, the weight of ω is(∑
a∈At\{l∗}
maxW(a)
)
+ wW(l)
with
∑
a∈At\{l∗}
maxW(a) = TW −maxW(l)
by definition of TW and Definition 8.
We now consider the evaluation of a formula of the form
c∧d or, equivalently, (ϕ1∧...∧ϕn)∧(ψ1∨...∨ψm). Using the
distributive law, we can rewrite this as (ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn ∧ ψ1) ∨
...∨ (ϕ1 ∧ ...∧ϕn ∧ψm). We thus need to verify whether the
weight of a formula of the form θ = (ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn ∧ ψi) is
correctly determined. The possible world ω such that ω |= θ
with the highest associated weight is the one that entails all
literals not found in θ with the maximum associated weight.
We have that the weight of ω is given by∑
a∈At\lit∗(θ)
maxW(a) +
∑
l∈lit(θ)
wW(l)
with
∑
a∈At\lit∗(θ)
maxW(a) = TW −
∑
l∈lit(θ)
maxW(l)
where lit∗(θ) = {l∗ | l ∈ lit(θ)}. Finally, we consider the
situation where lit(θ) is inconsistent, i.e. there exists an a ∈ At
such that {a,¬a} ⊆ lit(θ). We then have λ(θ) = −∞ and,
correspondingly, Definition 10 returns −∞.
Proposition 7. Computing the λ-value of a formula ϕ ∈ Lt
using a compact epistemic state can be implemented using
an algorithm with O(k · log2 |At|) complexity where k is the
number of literals in ϕ.
Proof: An algorithm can straightforwardly be devised
based on Definition 10 that traverses a given formula tree
and collects the bounded literals in each conjunctive branch.
Such a traversal is linear in the size of the formula. Once the
set of bounded literals has been determined, the λ-value can
be computed by retrieving the n distinct literals found in the
bounded branch. Assuming that the compact epistemic state is
encoded as a sorted map, retrieving the value of each literal
is O(log2 |At|). In the worst case, the value of all literals in
the formula need to be determined. We thus need to retrieve
at most k values where k is the number of literals in ϕ.
Similar as in the previous section, it is possible to extend the
language Lt to a language L≥t for which it is easy to evaluate
formulas of the form ϕ ≥ ψ or ϕ > ψ. We have seen that
evaluating a formula ϕ ∈ Lt is tractable. Once we know the
value λ(ϕ) of a formula ϕ, we can readily apply pare(ϕ ≥ ψ)
from Section II. As such, we define L≥t in BNF as 3:
disj ::= a | ¬a | disj 1 ∨ disj 2
conj ::= a | ¬a | conj 1 ∧ conj 2
ϕ ::= a | ¬a | disj ∧ conj | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | ϕ1 ≥ ϕ2 | ϕ1 > ϕ2
Example 8. Consider W ′′ from Example 6. We have that c ≥
a∧b since λ(c) = 11 and λ(a∧b) = 11−5−4+5+(−3) = 4.
Similarly, we can verify that (c > b) ∨ (c > a) since 11 > 4
and 11 6> 11, i.e. we have > ∨⊥ or max {>,⊥} = >.
V. RELATED WORK
Syntactic operators for revision with either classical or
uncertain inputs have been considered in the literature, where
most deal with classical inputs and are based on the AGM
style of revision (e.g. [1], [15]). Syntactic operators that are
able to deal with iterated belief revision, which is most often
defined on a semantical level, are far less common. Operators
for iterated belief change are usually defined on the level of
3See http://www.eeecs.qub.ac.uk/∼k.bauters/ictai14 for a Python implemen-
tation of the tractable syntactic approach presented in this paper.
8epistemic states, for which we can use Ordinal Conditional
Functions (OCF) [17] or, for example, the representation we
used in this paper based on [14]. A syntactic representation for
OCF [17], along with the conditions that such a representation
has to satisfy, was presented in [19].
A syntactic revision operator in the setting of possibility
theory was later presented in [4] that could also deal with
uncertain input. This operator makes use of the ability to
transform a possibility distribution into an OCF and vice versa,
effectively developing a revision operator for both frameworks
based on the earlier work. However, this approach treats
uncertain input as a form of conditioning, where the resulting
beliefs have to conclude the formula with exactly the given
degree of uncertainty. They do not interpret uncertain inputs
as in this paper, i.e. as information that strengthens or weakens
the beliefs that the agent currently holds. Postulates for how
to reasonably treat uncertain input as unreliable information
were only presented later in the literature [14].
Interesting work in the BDI setting has been done in [2],
where the authors develop a tractable form of belief revision
by devising a cross-over between AGM style revision and
reason-maintenance style belief revision [9]. In particular, in
a BDI setting where beliefs are modelled by literals (and
plans take their usual form of rules) it can be shown that
the operator satisfies most of the AGM postulates. Still, this
approach can only deal with classical input. A framework for
BDI agents dealing with uncertain input has been presented
in [5], where the authors develop a theoretical framework
based on possibility theory where both beliefs and desires
are represented as possibility distributions. Confusingly, [14]
used the term belief change that was also used in [5], but
both frameworks are distinct. In [5] they then develop a way
to select the best set of goals to be adapted depending on
the consistency of these goals, which in turn depends on
the uncertain beliefs of the agent. Their work was extended
in [6] where they developed a syntactic approach for their
framework, highlighting the practical feasibility. However, as
discussed, their work is based on the notion of interpreting
uncertain input in the sense of conditioning, where the beliefs
of the agent need to exactly reflect the input uncertainty.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to
introduce a syntactic approach to belief change as defined
in [14] for dealing with unreliable input. Our approach can
easily be implemented using off-the-shelf satisfiability solvers.
We proved the correctness of the approach and showed how
we can extend it to a more expressive language that allows
an agent to reason over the plausibility of its beliefs. With
the advent of satisfiability solvers that work directly on NNF
formulas [12] our approach furthermore promises to be fast.
An experimental evaluation of the approach is, however,
left for future work. For situations where we are dealing
with a resource-bounded agent, we also proposed a tractable
approach to belief change. To obtain a tractable approach,
some restrictions were imposed. Particularly, inputs are limited
to weighted literals (a restriction common in other tractable
approaches) and determining the weight of arbitrary formulas
is only feasible for fragments of the propositional language.
Still, the fragment we identified allows for formulas in DNF to
be efficiently evaluated. Belief change in the tractable approach
can be implemented using a O(log2 |At|) algorithm with |At|
the number of atoms under consideration, while the evaluation
of a formula in the fragment we identified can be implemented
in a O(k · log2 |At|) algorithm with k the number of unique
literals in the formula to be evaluated.
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